Oct. 7 altered Israeli society's expectations of its military's performance fundamentally. Prior to the massacre, the measure of success for any round of fighting between Israel and terrorist organizations was the quality and duration of the ensuing quiet. If the calm was prolonged and substantial, the operation was deemed successful. If not, it was considered a failure.
Post-Oct. 7, the metric has shifted. A violent engagement is no longer gauged by the peace it generates but by the initiative it enables. A successful military operation is one that enhances the IDF's freedom of action and allows for more effective engagement with the enemy.
The IDF's massive ground operation didn't eradicate Hamas, but it did fracture the terror organization. It transformed a hierarchical, coordinated, and organized army into a collection of uncoordinated and disorganized terrorist cells. As a result, the Gaza Strip hasn't become a Hamas-free zone but rather an area accessible to the IDF.
The model for Operation Iron Swords mirrors the successful model of Operation Defensive Shield from about 20 years ago: boldly maneuvering into the terrorist organizations' centers of gravity, destabilizing their equilibrium, and gaining operational freedom throughout the entire area. Subsequently, in the second phase, this operational freedom is used to repeatedly raid the territory, damage the enemy's capabilities, and ultimately lead to its attrition, dilution, and neutralization. The first phase is inherently more massive but shorter, while the second phase requires fewer forces but extends over a longer period. Unlike the maneuver that broke Hamas's army and took about a year, the hunt for its cells will continue for many more years.
Had a hostage deal been achieved before the entry into Khan Younis or before the maneuver in Rafah, it could have jeopardized the completion of phase one, preventing the transformation of the entire Gaza Strip into an accessible area for the military. At that time, a large-scale deal could have led to the realization of one war objective – freeing the hostages – at the expense of another - defeating Hamas. However, today, when a deal would not halt the maneuver, as it has already been completed, the strategic cost of the deal is much lower. The price is a slowdown and delay in the long and difficult phase of eroding and diluting the remaining capabilities. At this juncture, a deal allows for the achievement of all war objectives.
The path to healing
The war has an additional goal, not recorded in the Cabinet decision protocols, but etched in the hearts of reserve soldiers, bereaved families, and wounded IDF personnel: to heal the rifts tearing Israeli society apart from within. The path to healing is long and difficult, but it cannot be embarked upon without the knowledge that the State of Israel has done everything to bring its sons and daughters back from Hamas's hell.
If the collective memory is tainted by the knowledge that our brothers and sisters did not return home due to Israeli refusal, we will not be able to rebuild trust and promote internal reconciliation in society.
The two war objectives can be translated into two moral and Jewish aspirations: to dismantle Hamas and to unite Israel. Without the maneuver, we would not have succeeded in shattering Hamas into isolated cells, but without a deal and the return of the hostages, we will not be able to reconnect the painful pieces that make up Israeli society.
