The hostage deal currently taking shape between Gaza, Jerusalem, Qatar, Washington, and Mar-a-Lago is a flawed agreement, negotiated at an inopportune time and under unfavorable conditions.
At its core, the deal stipulates that an unspecified number of hostages kidnapped on October 7 will be returned to their homes, their people, and their families – an undoubtedly emotional moment – in exchange for Hamas' military, economic, and governmental rehabilitation. However, this is set to occur at a time when, had Israel and President Donald Trump waited just a few days, they could have swiftly improved the terms.
According to senior Israeli officials, Trump's rigid expectation for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to finalize a deal before his presidential inauguration is what compelled Netanyahu to accept the current framework. It remains unclear to what extent Netanyahu attempted to persuade the president's envoy, Steven Witkoff, to allow for a more favorable agreement once Trump officially assumes office. Nevertheless, it's evident that a brief delay could have significantly enhanced the likelihood of securing better terms.
The agreement, poised to take effect imminently, will undoubtedly bolster Hamas. The organization, despite suffering substantial losses, stands to receive at least 1,000 new operatives directly from Israeli prisons. This influx of "new blood" – both figuratively and literally – is likely to reignite violence within Gaza and potentially beyond its borders.
These released prisoners, some of whom are particularly violent offenders, have undergone years of ideological reinforcement and organizational consolidation while in Israeli custody, preparing for their eventual return to terrorist activities. Israel, in taking this step, is repeating a historically proven mistake, as mass releases of prisoners have consistently triggered waves of renewed terror. This pattern was evident in 1985 following the Jibril deal, which precipitated the first intifada, and again with the Schalit deal in 2011, which saw the release of Yahya Sinwar, the architect and executor of the October 7 atrocities.
The newly freed operatives are expected to quickly integrate into Hamas's extensive network across Judea and Samaria, Gaza, Qatar, and Turkey, from where they will likely orchestrate new attacks. This scenario is comparable to the United States allowing Guantanamo detainees to disperse along its borders with Canada and Mexico a year after 9/11, or permitting them to join Taliban forces against US troops in Afghanistan – a notion that defies strategic logic.
Furthermore, the Hamas deal encompasses a substantial increase in the flow of goods and fuel into Gaza, bolstering the group's military and economic capabilities. Hamas is already exploiting incoming fuel supplies for tunnel construction and operation. Recent testimonies from Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers confirm that Hamas continues to engage in combat from within these underground networks.
The newly freed operatives are expected to quickly integrate into Hamas's extensive network across Judea and Samaria, Gaza, Qatar, and Turkey, from where they will likely orchestrate new attacks. This scenario is comparable to the United States allowing Guantanamo detainees to disperse along its borders with Canada and Mexico a year after 9/11, or permitting them to join Taliban forces against US troops in Afghanistan – a notion that defies strategic logic.
The additional fuel allotted to Hamas will enable further enhancement of their subterranean infrastructure, laying the groundwork for future conflicts. Essentially, Israel is inadvertently aiding its adversary's preparations against it – an almost inconceivable yet factual situation.
Even amid ongoing hostilities, Hamas forcibly commandeers a significant portion of the fuel and supply trucks entering Gaza, selling goods to Gazans at exorbitant prices. This not only reinforces Hamas's control over Gaza but also provides them with funds to pay salaries and recruit new members. This partial recovery, initiated even before the ceasefire, indicates the potential scale and speed of the organization's full reconstruction once the IDF ceases operations and withdraws from captured areas.
While the IDF faces justified criticism for Hamas's enduring strength five and a half months post-massacre, one strategic misstep does not justify another. It's crucial to note that a primary factor in Hamas' continued existence has been the persistent stance of outgoing President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who have effectively supported Hamas throughout the conflict.
Despite clear evidence that the unrestricted flow of supplies into Gaza serves as Hamas' economic and existential lifeline, Biden and Blinken compelled Netanyahu to maintain this policy. Israel had hoped that Trump would reverse this approach, anticipating that on January 20, he would direct Netanyahu to "starve out Hamas" by limiting Gaza's imports to the bare essentials.
Paradoxically, it is now Trump who is pressuring Netanyahu to accept a framework designed in May 2024 under the Biden administration – a time when Sinwar was still alive and the pager operation against Hezbollah had not yet commenced, Hezbollah remained a significant threat, and the Israeli Air Force had not yet neutralized Iran's air defense systems.
The absence of strategic acumen in this deal is glaring, making it perplexing why the author of "The Art of the Deal" is pushing Israel towards what essentially amounts to a pact with its sworn enemy.
