Behind the optimistic statements President Trump occasionally makes about the progress of contacts between the US and Iran, and about a good deal being just around the corner, recent developments in the region tell a somewhat different story, one that has managed to confuse even top experts.
Against the backdrop of Iranian efforts to break the blockade at Hormuz, as well as the last-minute cancellation of another round of talks in Islamabad, Trump announced that the ceasefire would be extended to allow Iran to formulate a suitable proposal, while the US continues the blockade.
Between a deal and a strike: Is Trump buying time?
According to Fox News, Trump extended the ceasefire by three to five days. That is roughly the amount of time it will take the US aircraft carrier George Bush to reach the Middle East and join the two carriers already stationed in the region. That raises the question of whether Trump is buying time for military preparations ahead of renewed strikes, or whether this is merely leverage intended to force Iran to accept US demands, especially on the nuclear issue.
It seems we are at a critical juncture in which both a deal and renewed fighting are plausible scenarios. On the one hand, both sides appear eager to avoid escalation. In Tehran, there seems to be a growing understanding that while maintaining red lines, it would be wise to focus efforts on securing an agreement that would allow the regime to recover and rebuild, particularly through the lifting of sanctions and the immediate release of economic resources. The understanding is that as long as the US blockade continues, the economic damage will only deepen, meaning time is working against them and concessions once considered unthinkable may now be unavoidable.
In that context, the frantic pace of the negotiations may suggest that there is no consensus in Iran over what compromises with Washington are actually realistic.
The moderate camp associated with President Masoud Pezeshkian, who is not part of the delegation team, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who is involved in the talks, reflects a relatively conciliatory line. That stems from an understanding that Iran's socioeconomic crisis is a ticking time bomb, and that without an end to the war, even at the cost of painful concessions, the Iranian regime could collapse entirely.
"We didn't destroy Israel, we only survived"
On the other hand, the ones setting the tone are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps under Ahmad Vahidi, and they are making clear in public that they will not back down. The official leading the negotiating team, who previously served as commander of the Revolutionary Guards' air force and now serves as speaker of the Islamic republic's parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, is also known for his hawkish approach.
It is interesting to note, however, that Ghalibaf himself admitted publicly only a few days ago that "we didn't destroy Israel, we only survived," and that Iran must recognize its military inferiority vis-a-vis the US and Israel. In that same speech, he called for taking advantage of the window of opportunity to sign an agreement from a position of strength, even if it does not amount to a total victory, before Iran is weakened significantly further. Trump's comment about divisions within the leadership, which may have been intended to sow confusion among decision-makers in Iran, may in fact reflect a real rift.
Washington, too, appears to be making a genuine effort to reach an agreement. In the background are very low levels of overall public support for the war, in contrast to the high and stable support within Trump's base, alongside economic effects that are being felt clearly by the American consumer. In that context, the somewhat softened clauses in a possible framework for ending the war, published by Amit Segal ahead of the now-canceled round of talks, may be interpreted as a certain retreat from the US' initial position.
Those clauses include halting uranium enrichment for 15 years, converting uranium into fuel, full oversight of nuclear sites, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, ending the war and withdrawing US forces, and lifting economic sanctions. If this does indeed reflect a sincere American effort to move toward an agreement, it should worry Israel. The restriction period has been shortened from 20 years to 15, and that is certainly a step back from Trump's earlier declarations that "they will never have a nuclear weapon." In addition, the issue of ballistic missiles is conspicuously absent.
At the same time, it is too early to write off renewed fighting. According to reports, Trump continues to pour forces and weapons into the region, in addition to the special units that have been sent and that are capable of carrying out raids, such as on Kharg Island.
Although Trump may for the time being be satisfied with a strategy of economic strangulation, which in itself is a catalyst for significantly weakening the regime, and may prefer that without being dragged into a kinetic campaign, continued Iranian aggression such as firing at ships in Hormuz could trigger a broad regional flare-up involving additional players, perhaps including Israel.
If Iran pushes too far, Trump may have no choice but to carry out strikes, even limited ones, against energy infrastructure and other civilian infrastructure, as he has threatened. Iran, too, understands the fragility of the contacts and the high potential for escalation, and it is likely working to recover missile stockpiles damaged in strikes and restore access to launchers while making additional preparations.
What about the Houthis?
A few days before the first round of US-Iran talks in Islamabad, senior Houthi official Mohammed Ali al-Houthi said in a CNN interview on April 6 that the organization would continue to honor the ceasefire with the US and would not resume attacks in the Red Sea or against American targets as long as the US behaved similarly. One may assume the timing of the statement was not accidental.
Then on Saturday, it was reported that Houthi Defense Minister Mohammed al-Atifi declared, "Yemen's armed forces are on high alert to confront any aggression against the Yemeni people." Al-Atifi claimed the fighting had demonstrated the "unity of the arenas" and exposed the "weakness and fragility of American bases in the region."
Around the same time, Iranian parliament member Esmail Kosari said that a US threat of a naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz "is more of a political bluff than reality." He also hinted that Iran would not make do with Hormuz and that Red Sea shipping lanes are also in its sights.
So far, Houthi involvement in the war has remained relatively limited, with the launch of only a few missiles toward Israel. It may be that Tehran is waiting to see whether in any renewed talks, the US will agree to remove the naval blockade, a blockade that is inflicting heavy economic damage on Iran.
If not, Iran may decide to pull out the Houthi card as an additional means of pressuring international trade by closing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical artery for the movement of energy and goods, the volume of which has already dropped dramatically since Houthi attacks during the Swords of Iron war.
The Yemeni rebels could directly attack Saudi Arabia's Yanbu port, the outlet of the oil pipeline that bypasses Hormuz to the Red Sea, disrupt freedom of navigation by resuming attacks on ships, and even strike sensitive energy production infrastructure in a way that would completely shut down output. That is the Gulf states' nightmare scenario.
