"It must be remembered that we are in the preliminary stage of one of the greatest battles in history, that we are in action at many other points in Norway and in Holland, that we have to be prepared in the Mediterranean, that the air battle is continuous and that many preparations, such as have been indicated by my hon. In this crisis, I hope I may be pardoned if I do not address the House at any length today. I hope that any of my friends and colleagues, or former colleagues who are affected by the political reconstruction, will make allowance, all allowance, for any lack of ceremony with which it has been necessary to act. I would say to the House, as I said to those who have joined this government: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat. We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many long months of struggle and suffering. You ask, what is our policy? I can say: It is to wage war, by sea, land, and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us, to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalog of human crime. That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory despite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival." (Winston Churchill, May 13, 1940).
Eight months had passed between the outbreak of World War II when Winston Churchill delivered his historic "blood, sweat and tears" speech – the same period that has elapsed since the stunning blow of the Hamas attack on Israel. It took the British several months to understand that the world they knew would never return. It seems that a similar message needs to be heard by the people of Israel today.
For before us also stands "an ordeal of the most grievous kind against a dark monstrous tyranny" – a tyranny led by Iran, of which Hamas is just one arm, and which will soon lay its hands on nuclear weapons. We too "are in the preliminary stage of one of the greatest battles in history" because it is clear today that the destruction of Hamas is not a matter of weeks, but of months and years.
As Hamas weakens, Hezbollah will likely increase the pressure, aiming to draw us into the Lebanese trap. If war breaks out against Nasrallah, its costs will be much heavier. About 5,000 missiles a day, widespread hits on well-known Israeli symbols, damage to infrastructure, and many casualties. The extensive fires in the north this week gave a small illustration. All these are just a prelude to what nuclear Iran is preparing for us. The ballistic missile attack from its territory on April 14 was a taste. Someone needs to prepare the people sitting in Zion for such scenarios.
Like the Nazis in the 1930s, the Iranians have also armed themselves from head to toe for this great confrontation. Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran who is the Hitler of our time, has been preparing it diligently and cunningly for many years. We, like the British at the time, reduced the army, privatized the military industries, closed production lines, celebrated abroad, and lived naively as if "peace in our time" had been achieved. The pain of sobering up, then as today, is unbearable.
Churchill, with a problematic unity government, harnessed the entire British people to a war of survival. Even with him, by the way, cabinet secretaries– and according to some versions, even he himself at times – toyed with ideas of surrender during the war. The great British leader begged for American aid, much like the Israelis are praying today for Trump's victory in the elections.
The main thing is that the entire British society, from youth to old age, enlisted in the campaign against the Nazis. Children filled sandbags in London, women went to the home army, and men to the front. This tough people, who until the outbreak of the war ruled most of the world and whose elite enjoyed lives of plenty, understood the hard way that the days of pampering were over and that if their identity and values were important to them, they had no choice but to fight and pay.
What was true for the British 84 years ago is true for Israel today. Honest leadership would tell this to the public. We face difficult years ahead. To reach their finish line victorious, they require the harnessing of all parts of the people, systems, and elites. The policies and tools that may have suited the routine before October 7 are not relevant to the yoke now facing Israel. Every citizen must understand this. Every factor must check what needs to be corrected in its area of responsibility. Every public figure needs to rise to the greatness of the hour.
Here are some practical things that urgently need to happen. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must conclude the discussions with the IDF with clear guidelines. Many commanders appreciate his stubborn pursuit of victory but believe that his directives, in the end, are not clear enough. At the same time, the army, on its part, must continue the military pressure on Hamas across the entire strip. The purge is necessary and must not be stopped, just as the Allies at no stage let up the pressure on the Nazis.
In another aspect, but no less important, the IDF must grow immediately and significantly to meet all the missions and fronts and prepare for the great war that may come. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant should have long since ordered the establishment of new divisions and the return to service of tens of thousands of reserve soldiers, who have been thrown out over the years. The system that the IDF has been practicing since the outbreak of the fighting, of relying on volunteers who are willing to return to reserve service, is not enough. Even in the army, they know that the reserve system is stretched thin. To be prepared for future challenges, it must grow. Such a major move requires appropriate and credible messages from the leadership, which will convince the people that everyone who can – should enlist.
In a complementary move, the government must force the Haredim to contribute their share to the military campaign, and at the same time extend the compulsory service to 36 months as the IDF requests. These two complementary steps are critical. Neither the Haredim, nor the IDF, nor the government can continue to sing the old tunes here.
At the same time, the army must undergo reform during the war, pushing forward the most combative and cunning officers. This is not being done; here, too, the responsibility is on Gallant. In addition, he and Netanyahu must embark on an emergency plan that will bring the military industries to arms independence as quickly as possible so that we will not be dependent on the US. If you will it, it is no dream.
All these actions, of course, cost a lot of money, that is, there is also an economic price. The leadership needs to tell the people that the economic boom of recent decades will at least slow down. It needs to set a personal example in willingness to lower the standard of living. This is its role.
At the same time, it is requested that large companies and banks do not exploit the war to make greedy profits but also put their hand in their pocket and ask how they can help. Patriotism is not a dirty word, even when it comes to business. And by the way, if the private sector does not help, it will eventually be hurt, either because of increasing pressures from outside or because of the budgetary hole from home. The war has almost doubled government spending, and no one said the worst is behind us.
The most important is the spirit. In the War of Independence, Nathan Alterman and Haim Hefer told the story of the campaign and touched hearts. Today, there are singers who fight, but there is a lot of lamentation and crying in the media, which, together with the leadership, does not tell the right story to the people. Too often, both the complaints in the studios and the politicians' gimmicks severely damage morale.
Instead of saying bravely that we face years that require an all-national effort that is unprecedented in all areas of life – both politicians, senior officials, and journalists continue to tell last year's stories. Well, it's time for a version update. To overcome the challenge facing the Zionist enterprise, also the tone-setters in culture and journalism must make it clear that the entire country is a front and that all the people are enlisted. This war is unlike anything we have known; the giants of culture and literature need to say their word if we are life-seekers. For this is our goal, "Victory; Victory at all costs, victory despite all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival".
Replace the People?
"The Landlord" is Ido Norden's new book; one chapter was published this week in Israel Hayom caused a storm. In essence, he reveals that in the first week of the war, the best IDF units began preparing for a large and bold operation to rescue a group of hostages from Al-Shifa Hospital in the Gaza Strip. The Depth Command chief, the GOC Southern Command, and the 98th Division commander, "who sat on the plan 24/7," supported it. The Israeli Air Force was a partner. The IDF Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, ultimately decided not to carry out the plan, and the issue did not rise to the political level.
Norden, an economist and lawyer by training and now a businessman, claims that "the rule of functionaries in Israel," as stated in the book's subtitle, led to the collapse of the systems on October 7. He is furious that the IDF Chief of Staff Halevi stopped the preparations for the operation without presenting the dilemma to the political level.
We met for the first time about a month ago. Three minutes of conversation made it clear that this is a serious person with a serious argument who also filled a series of senior positions in public service. He voiced criticism of the excessive power of "officialdom" and senior officials in the professional ranks long before the disaster of October 7, and most of the book's chapters were written before the war. But what he saw in his reserve service in the "pit" (the underground bunker) in the Kirya IDF headquarters only strengthened him.
Q: Why do you think the chief of staff's cancellation of the operation alone is so severe? He is the army commander; in his opinion, the plan was not ripe; it was his authority.
"A chief of staff can certainly think that a particular operation is not good enough. But suppose such an operation has such great strategic significance for the country's long-term significance in such a heavy issue as the hostages; in that case, this decision should reach the decision-makers' desk. The cabinet also instructed him to present operations to release hostages. So this is a clear and sharp example of a case where the senior official level – in this case, the security establishment – does not count the political level but conducts completely independent policy and allows itself to make critical decisions over the head of the elected level.
"This happens less than a week after the same chief of staff and Shin Bet chief did not update the political level on what happened with Hamas on the night of October 7. We are talking about a situation where the Shin Bet chief unexpectedly ends his vacation and goes to the Shin Bet headquarters, is there all night, and doesn't say a word to the prime minister until the Hamas attack is already starting. That is to say, it's not point-specific. It's part of an undemocratic mode of conduct. People who were not elected to their positions by the public made the most critical decisions for the future of the state. This is a blow to Israel's national resilience in all aspects."
Q: But everyone was wrong about Hamas, not just the official level or the army in this case.
"The collapse of October 7 didn't happen in a vacuum, but because there is a hegemony of the senior officialdom that imposed its worldview on all the systems. People in the highest ranks think the same thing: monolithic thinking. Whoever has a different opinion is pushed aside, and Brigadier-General (res.) Ofer Winter is an example. There is a hegemony here that imposed a worldview. In this case, the security officialdom presented to the civlian echelon what it wants to see. It channels to what it wants the prime minister to choose. The elected officials have no option, or at least it's very difficult, to do something other than what the officialdom wants.
"As we've seen, it doesn't matter who the prime minister was – Naftali Bennett, Benjamin Netanyahu, Yair Lapid– their decision range is very limited. They don't have the option to make a real decision. This is how the officialdom controls the systems, and in the book, I bring many examples that show the method. This is true for security, economy, law, and every field. There is almost no dimension that is not influenced by the bias of the senior officialdom; it is the one that rules and is assisted by supporting systems that are the law and the media until it effectively neutralizes elected officials. Or, as a friend told me, we go to the polls only to choose the ministers that the officials will rule."
In the book, there are many examples of policy decisions made by those officials. Some are known, but most are not. I ask Norden to mention two particularly significant events in his opinion. In the first, one of the justice ministers brings to the government a proposal to separate the attorney general from the role of the state attorney, "as is customary in all democracies in the world. In response, the attorney general in the cabinet meeting reads from a note the names of half of the government ministers, who are being examined for criminal suspicions against them, are in conflict with his opinion and are prevented from voting. Some heard for the first time that there was a suspicion or investigation against them. Even the others whose names were not read understood the message, and the proposal was removed from the agenda."
In another case, the metro planners decided not to connect its route to Highway 6 in the Neve Yamin, even though such a crossing point would serve the far-flung communities well. "It's a matter of a few kilometers, and it wasn't even done with bad intention. The decision-makers are not bad people, but ones who live in the center and simply pass over the other parts of the country." On the other hand, the natural gas regimen approved by the government in the previous decade is an exceptional case, where the prime minister refused to accept the opposition of the legal advice and exceptionally even appeared in the High Court to get its approval. "This is the exception that proves the rule," Norden emphasizes.
Q: There are elected officials who give such an impression that you prefer that they don't make decisions.
"So you suggest replacing the people or canceling democracy?! These people are elected officials, and part of the issue is that they also created an incorrect awareness about them. Because I sat in government meetings, most of them are good people who want the public good and need to be accountable to it. If they fail, they will be replaced at the ballot box, which is not the case with the officials. And by the way, I also saw unworthy appointments that the officialdom made. People don't understand that even the chief of staff, the prime minister, and the Defense Minister can't really choose because the range of options before them is very limited as a result of the method."
Norden refrains in the book and also in the interview from naming names. "It's not this or that person, but a method and culture that have contaminated all public service in Israel. If you want to fix, you need to fundamentally change the way the officialdom works and the balance point between it and the elected level. It's in our souls."
The solution he proposes is more reminiscent of the system of government in the US, where the winning side in the elections appoints the senior officialdom close to its worldview. "We need to set strict rules regarding the quality and professionalism of the position holders. It is also clear that their considerations should be state-like and not political. But once they are professionally worthy, they can be from the ruling party's central committee. This is preferable to a situation where young officials in the budget department, who haven't seen anything in life, make decisions on policy."
Response from IDF Spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari: "The operational idea came up to the chief of staff, and there was no intelligence that allowed to proceed to a rescue operation. If there had been intelligence that allowed a rescue operation, we would have proceeded with the plan to the point of realization. Wherever there was a real alternative (to release hostages) during the war, it was presented to the political level."
