The Middle East has found its own version of Baba Vanga, the blind Bulgarian mystic whose apocalyptic predictions continue making headlines three decades after her death. Mohammed Ali al-Husseini, secretary of the Arab Islamic Council in Lebanon, has become a rising star on Israeli social media with his prophecies about the deaths of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. This week, he added two more predictions: the imminent elimination of Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah's new secretary general, and an upcoming Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear sites. Unlike Baba Vanga, al-Husseini remains sharp and sardonic, though predicting Qassem's fate hardly requires mystical powers.
What al-Husseini didn't foresee was this week's leaked reports detailing breakthrough progress in Israel-Lebanon negotiations, led by US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein. These leaks, attributed to "a source familiar with the details" – reportedly the Israeli prime minister's spokesperson Omer Dostri's new code name – revealed that Israel had approached Washington last week requesting Hochstein's visit following his talks in Beirut. The Americans responded that Hochstein would only come "when both sides demonstrate seriousness" – an understandable position from someone who's spent a year navigating diplomatic ups and downs during wartime, reluctant to risk embarrassment just days before the US presidential election. Yet here they come – both Hochstein and Brett McGurk, the US President's Middle East envoy.
Is this optimism overshadowing professional judgment, or is genuine progress being made? Likely both. Evidence comes not only from the extensively leaked details about the emerging agreement but also from Tuesday's limited cabinet discussion convened by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address Lebanese developments.
The pace has undeniably accelerated. After a year of stalemate, there's no denying the catalyst: the IDF's dramatic operational advances in Lebanon. Ten days ago, before Hochstein's Beirut visit, the Prime Minister's Office sent the White House a framework for ending hostilities with Hezbollah and enabling displaced residents on both sides to return home. Its cornerstone provision would allow the IDF to actively enforce compliance, ensuring Hezbollah doesn't rearm or rebuild military infrastructure. This week's organized leak provided comprehensive details of the proposal.
The proposed Israeli-Lebanese agreement, backed by the US and other nations, rests on three pillars:
- Expanded implementation of UN Resolution 1701, barring armed Hezbollah presence south of the Litani River. The Lebanese army would deploy along the border, while an enhanced UNIFIL force would include French, British, and German battalions – though Hezbollah has already rejected German participation, citing Germany's alliance with Israel.
- A robust international monitoring and enforcement mechanism. If Hezbollah violations aren't addressed promptly by Lebanese forces and UNIFIL, Israel would retain the right to act independently against threats – similar to the Multinational Force and Observers' (MFO) role in Sinai.
- Comprehensive prevention of Hezbollah's rearming through air, sea, and land routes. This makes any Israel-Lebanon arrangement far more complex than previous agreements, requiring regional cooperation for long-term success. No bilateral deal can survive if Hezbollah continues receiving weapons through porous Syrian borders.
Hezbollah's primary funding streams – drug trafficking and Iranian oil smuggling through Syrian ports – highlight why any border agreement must include parallel enforcement along the Lebanese-Syrian frontier. Only Russia has meaningful influence over Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime and Iranian presence in Syria. While Moscow hasn't yet entered the equation, its eventual involvement seems inevitable. Worth noting: any modifications to Resolution 1701 require Russian and Chinese approval as Security Council members. Initial stages may need mechanisms to work around this constraint.
Strategic interests survive diplomatic chill
Current Israel-Russia relations bear little resemblance to the era when Prime Minister Netanyahu boasted of his special relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Gone are the days of "special partnership" and warm birthday wishes for their October birthdays. Putin's antisemitic remarks early in the war still sting. Yet shared interests, particularly regarding Russian presence in Syria, maintain a minimal diplomatic pulse.
A few notable moments have punctuated this otherwise flat relationship. Military Secretary Roman Gofman's 24-hour Moscow visit in early September came to light during the prime minister's condolence call to the parents of Alex Lubnov, a hostage killed in Hamas captivity. The revelation of Gofman's hostage-deal mission surprised many, given strengthened Russia-Iran ties and Moscow's anger over Israel's pro-Ukraine stance.
Another significant moment occurred ten days ago when a Tu214SR aircraft – known as the Kremlin's intelligence-equipped VIP transport – landed at Ben-Gurion International Airport. Its arrival sparked speculation about senior officials discussing two Russian-citizen hostages, Alexander Tropanov and Maxim Herkin. That same day, Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chief Mousa Abu Marzouk met Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow to discuss hostage negotiations, highlighting the Russian captives' priority status.
Beyond hostage discussions, analysts believe Russia seeks a mediating role between Israel and Iran, concerned about their direct confrontations. Moscow worries that escalating Israeli-Iranian tensions could disrupt its supply of Iranian missiles and drones for the Ukraine conflict. However, Russia's greater concern follows Israel's recent strike on Iran, which foreign reports say neutralized Russian-made air defenses, including the S-300 and advanced S-400 systems – the pride of Russian military technology.
A Telegram channel known for high-level Russian sources, reports serious concern about the strike's impact on Russian defense systems' reputation. Intelligence sources describe Iranian officials expressing strong dissatisfaction with the systems' performance, particularly the S-400, during talks with Russian Security Council head Sergei Shoigu. Rather than commit to providing new systems, Russia offered to send experts to improve Iranian operators' capabilities.
An Israeli strategic advisor familiar with Russian air defense systems suggests an even more troubling scenario. "Besides Iran's known S-400 battery, the region's only other active system guards Russia's Hmeimim air base in Syria. It should detect any significant air activity within its extensive range, certainly a wave of over 100 aircraft. If such a force passed through Israeli, Syrian, and Iraqi airspace toward Iran," he explained, "either it went undetected, or Russia chose not to alert Iran. They'd surely have warned Tehran if they'd known."
This situation unnerves not just Iran but likely Putin too, unaccustomed to technological embarrassment. These circumstances give Russia a strong incentive to help resolve the Israel-Lebanon conflict. While the Biden administration may resist Russian involvement, another administration might prove more amenable. Regardless, such complex arrangements rarely conclude in a single agreement. The regional dimension remains inescapable.
