The cabinet's decision on the five conditions required for ending the war has effectively resolved the dispute over the preferred course of action, since these conditions can only be met through a full occupation of Gaza. However, clarifications and limitations inserted in an attempt to navigate Israel's political and operational constraints have left gaps that Hamas will likely exploit to avoid defeat.
One example is the "waiting period" before the start of a move to seize Gaza City, along with the gradual implementation of the plan and the granting of an "escape hatch" to Hamas, enabling it to halt the attack against it at any moment, regain quiet, and reassert control. To break Hamas' spirit, it must be kept under continuous pressure, with the only way out for its members being surrender and the release of hostages.
Three options remain before Israel's political echelon regarding Gaza. None promises to deliver all the war's objectives. The reoccupation option, the riskiest of the three, is also the most likely to produce the outcome the cabinet set.
The first option exists only "on paper": surrender to Hamas' demands. This would mean a complete end to the war under US and international guarantees, withdrawal to the lines of October 6, allowing the entry of equipment and raw materials for reconstruction, and releasing imprisoned terrorists in exchange for hostages according to agreed terms.
The implications are clear: Hamas would remain the dominant power in Gaza under conditions allowing it to recover, with a reputation for surviving Israel's most intense military efforts. The idea of reducing the cost of this option by transferring civilian administration from Hamas to another body is mere window dressing, as is the possibility of unilateral US backing for Israeli moves against Hamas' military build-up.
Ending the war on these terms would not only cement Hamas' rule in Gaza but also pave the way for it to take over Judea and Samaria, where it already enjoys significant popularity. It would also turn hostage-taking into a survival guarantee for any terrorist attacking Israel.
The second option is encirclement and attrition, which could evolve into reoccupation. This approach places a lighter burden on the IDF, with fewer risks to soldiers and hostages. However, it would take an extensive amount time to yield results, and success is far from assured. The risk is that the prolonged effort could wear down Israeli forces, rather than Hamas.
The third option is the reoccupation of Gaza City and the central camps. Its main advantage is the clear message it sends: no more interim steps or pressure levers, but a move to end Hamas' terrorist rule entirely, leaving its members only one way to survive - surrender and release of hostages. The main disadvantages are the high risks to soldiers and hostages, and the diplomatic costs.
The cabinet's decision suffers from several key weaknesses. The first is the waiting period before action: if reports are correct that operations will only begin in October, Hamas will enjoy a lengthy window to regroup while supplies to Gaza peak, under reduced military pressure, without giving anything in return. To avoid this, Israel should move to encircle Gaza as soon as possible and then transition to a takeover once preparations are complete.
The second weakness is the phased execution, first Gaza City, then the central camps, which would leave Hamas safe havens for retreat and, in practice, bring the campaign to a halt before any move on the central camps, prompting renewed debate in Israel. This would prolong the timeline and signal to Hamas that the Gaza City operation is not the final blow. To counter this, efforts - even if limited - must be made in the central area alongside the Gaza City operation.
Israel's declaration that it would transfer control to another entity may have been intended to calm domestic and international concerns, but it also reassures Hamas that it can live with any authority that is not Israeli.
Another flaw is giving Hamas a "stop button" via willingness to enter a deal. To prevent Hamas from toying with Israel, the parameters for halting operations should be set in advance.
Beyond all this, it is time to act against Hamas leaders abroad and, separately, to advance US President Donald Trump's proposal for voluntary emigration. Public caution in discussing this is understandable, but formal statements are not necessary.
